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Previous work shows that joint communication tasks yield alignment of referring expressions, highlighting the role 
of interlocutors’ experience of shared common ground in establishing convention (Brennan & Clark, 1996; Horton, 
2008; Pickering & Garrod, 2004).  Less well-established, however, are predictions regarding which form~meaning 
mappings interlocutors will converge on.  To address this, we evaluate alignment in contexts where interlocutors’ 
common ground includes the costs of producing particular forms.  Our predictions stem from game theory, a 
formalism for modeling players’ reasoning about communication based on knowledge of the costs/rewards of 
particular moves and players’ understanding that such knowledge is shared (Jaeger, 2008; Lewis 1969).   
 
A game-theoretic model predicts that the use of an otherwise ambiguous form can convey meaning if an 
unambiguous form is costly and alternative meanings can be conveyed at low cost. In other words, a listener who 
knows the relative costs of unambiguously referring to X (high-cost) or Y (low-cost) may reason that a speaker 
using a low-cost ambiguous word X-or-Y intends to convey X, or else she would have used the low-cost word Y.  
For example, the word ‘some’ can be used literally to refer to some and possibly all entities (“some fish swim” is 
true even if all fish swim) or to some-but-not-all entities (“some children are girls”).  The literal meaning of ‘some’ 
is therefore weaker and conveys less information than ‘all’. Its meaning is strengthened from some-possibly-all to 
some-but-not-all through implicature—i.e., a speaker obeying the maxim of Quantity and intending to convey the 
more informative meaning ‘all’ would have used the stronger form, but since the speaker didn’t say ‘all’, the some-
but-not-all meaning is favored.  A game-theoretic account of ‘some’ reasons that the implicated some-but-not-all 
meaning is conveyed given the availability of the low-cost word ‘all’ for the alternative stronger meaning.  To test 
whether cost-based pragmatic inferencing applies beyond a fixed lexical host like “some”, we measure alignment 
in a communication game with superimposed costs/rewards for production/comprehension.   
 
Participants took turns as Sender and Receiver, naming and identifying 6 objects with 8 words:  3 tree objects and 
3 flower objects; 6 unambiguous names and the ambiguous generics “tree” and “flower” (see below).  On each 
turn, the game highlighted one object for the Sender, who then incurred a point cost for communicating a word to 
the Receiver.  If the Receiver correctly identified the intended object, both players earned points and the roles 
were reversed. Ambiguous words were low-cost. The absolute value of the point costs is less important than the 
relative ranking of the different signals’ costs. Each category contained either one high-cost unambiguous word 
(Study 1) or two relatively costly unambiguous words (Study 2).  Games continued for 20 minutes (~60 trials) 
unless the pair converged on a form~meaning mapping that permitted low-cost and effective communication. 
 
As predicted, the successful use of ambiguous words reflected the costs of the unambiguous words:  Pairs that 
converged did so with mappings involving low-cost generic words (e.g., “tree”) that referred to items with costly 
unambiguous names (e.g., pine tree).  Across trials, high-cost items yielded more ambiguous words produced 
(mixed-effects model:  p<0.001) and successfully understood (p<0.001).  Even with more similar costs (Study 2), 
most pairs converged, though some settled on a convention whereby the generic referred to the second-most-
costly item.  To rule out a trial-and-error strategy for finding an efficient alignment without recourse to pragmatic 
inference, we confirmed that Receivers inferred, more often than chance, that the high-cost object was intended 
when Senders first communicated an ambiguous word (χ2=7.26, p<0.007). These results contrast with work 
demonstrating ambiguity avoidance in the presence of referential competitors (Arnold & Griffin, 2007), by instead 
pinpointing how pragmatic inference about cost licenses the use of otherwise ambiguous words. Our results are in 
keeping with existing models of communicative efficiency (Genzel & Charniak, 2002; Levy & Jaeger, 2007) which 
highlight how production choices reflect the growth of speaker~listener common ground, though such models 
have not been applied to calculable implicatures regarding referring expressions like the ones that arise here. 
 
Study 1: one high-cost item per category; Study 2:  two more-similarly high-cost items per category 
Objects (presented as images): apple tree, palm tree, pine tree, rose, daisy, tulip 
Unambiguous words (Study 1/Study 2 point costs in parentheses, separated by ‘/’): “apple tree”(60/80), “palm 
tree”(120/135), “pine tree”(250/170), “rose”(60/80), “daisy”(120/140), “tulip”(280/165) 
Ambiguous words:  “tree” (80/80), “flower” (80/80) 
